Sunday, May 27, 2007
News

Do we want this?

Georgia competes for a new bio-terrorism facility—just an hour outside Atlanta

A worker holds up a vile of smallpox vaccine at the Tully Clinic at Hunter Army Airfield in Savannah on Jan. 20, 2003. Would having the NBAF site located outside Atlanta bring threats like smallpox and anthrax closer to home? CREDIT: Stephen Morton/Getty Images

What is NBAF? “High-consequence biological threats involving human, zoonotic (diseases that can be transmitted from animals to humans) and foreign animal diseases.”—A statement from the Department of Homeland Security on what will be researched at NBAF “Examples of potential biological threats include anthrax, smallpox, plague and various hemorrhagic fevers, as well as pathogens against agricultural products.”—The Texas Biological and Agro-Defense Consortium on what will be researched at NBAF “Its purpose is to be responsive.”—Terry Hastings, research spokesperson for UGA on what will be researched at NBAF

By Colby Dunn

African swine fever. West Nile virus. Foot-and-mouth disease. Severe acute respiratory syndrome, or SARS. Avian flu. Anthrax. Maybe even smallpox. It may sound like a list of things no one would want, but these are exactly what the Georgia Consortium for Health and Agro-Security has spent thousands of dollars and countless hours to get.
Georgia, along with 11 other states, is vying for the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility, or NBAF, a 500,000-square-foot site designed to research and combat infectious diseases that threaten humans and agriculture.

Federal visits are coming to a close and tension is mounting as states continue to jockey for position on the next shortlist, to be named in June, when only three to five candidates will remain. Public input will be gathered in July. The winner of the bid will be announced in October 2008, after full reports are made. Many hope that Georgia will have been able to snare the facility and its potential $3.5 billion economic boost.

According to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the NBAF will research “high-consequence biological threats involving human, zoonotic (diseases that can be transmitted from animals to humans) and foreign animal diseases.”

The Texas Biological and Agro-Defense Consortium, vying to place the facility in San Antonio, states, “Examples of potential biological threats include anthrax, smallpox, plague and various hemorrhagic fevers, as well as pathogens against agricultural products.”

The University of Georgia’s fact sheet on NBAF states the purpose of the facility “is to develop new diagnostics for detecting pathogens in humans, wildlife and domestic animals, and to develop vaccines and therapeutics that will prevent and treat new and existing diseases. Diseases that may be studied include foot-and-mouth disease, West Nile virus, avian influenza, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), anthrax and BSE or ‘mad cow’ disease.”

Terry Hastings, research spokesperson for UGA, says the DHS has no definitive list of what would be researched at the site, and that it will address needs as they arise.
“Its purpose is to be responsive,” says Hastings.

Georgia’s sexy scientific allure
The only one of its kind in the U.S., the NBAF will replace the aging Plum Island facility in New York, which came under considerable fire from Congress following Sept. 11, 2001 for possible security weaknesses. After a maelstrom of criticism, President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 in 2004, which requires the creation of a new facility, and the DHS put out a call for proposals. The call was answered by a herd of states and research universities, who began dangling everything from research expertise to discounted public amenities as bait, with dollar signs in their eyes.

According to UGA’s Carl Vinson Institute, the facility’s 20-year impact for Georgia could be nearly $1.5 billion in wages and salaries and an overall economic influx of $3.5 billion, not to mention the attraction of the nation’s brightest scientists and the prestige of hosting the only bio- and agro-defense research center in the U.S. As competition
for the facility began, the Georgia Consortium for Health and Agro-Security, led by Gov. Sonny Perdue and including representatives from UGA, the Georgia Department of Economic Development’s Innovation and Technology Office, the Georgia Research Alliance, Emory University, Georgia Tech and the Medical College of Georgia all sent in their own proposals.

The state ultimately offered up two sites in Athens, hoping that UGA’s reputation for veterinary disease research and proximity to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in Atlanta would entice the DHS to look south. Moreover, Georgia Tech has the fastest-growing bio-engineering program in the country, UGA already houses a USDA Agricultural Research Service and Augusta’s Medical College of Georgia is the largest medical school east of the Mississippi— and you’d better believe that Georgia
is highlighting those features as it battles with 17 other potential sites.

“Emory and the University of Georgia were just awarded a multi-million-dollar contract by NIH [the National Institutes of Health] to focus on influenza, both at the veterinary level, which is UGA’s component, and the human level, which is Emory’s component,” says Dr. David Stephens, director of Emory’s Infectious Disease Department.
After proposals were submitted, candidates were short-listed for visits from top DHS officials to tour potential locations, which gave the sites a chance to show off their attributes. Georgia pulled out all the stops for their site visit in April, producing a 15-minute video called “Advantage Georgia” that touts the cultural and academic prowess of Athens and Atlanta, complete with interviews with professors and researchers who insist they wouldn’t live anywhere else. It also provides detailed information about the two chosen parcels, one on College Station Road, which borders directly on the Oconee River, and the other at the southern end of Milledge Avenue.

“The inclusion of this site [UGA] as a finalist for NBAF is a clear recognition of the critical mass of biomedical and health research ongoing at the University of Georgia and the associated federal facilities,” UGA President Michael F. Adams said in a recent statement. He and others seem to be keeping their fingers crossed that this critical mass will help them outpace other heavyweight candidates like North Carolina, where the Research Triangle, with its three major universities and proximity to major
pharmaceutical companies, piles numerous important advantages in its corner.

Is it safe?
Proponents of the project say NBAF will bring as many as 1,000 new jobs to Georgia and will attract important resources that can help protect the health of the state’s residents. But although the benefits to the state and the federal government are numerous, the possible introduction of infectious, highly contagious and incurable diseases begs the question: Is it safe?

The Georgia Consortium, of course, says yes. The facility would be classified as a BSL-4 area, which means it will receive the highest level of security available. Scientists will be working in state-of-the-art, sealed laboratories and, after all, similar research is already being conducted successfully and, thus far, without incident at the USDA facility in Athens. The NBAF fact sheet provided by UGA cites the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, saying that there are no recorded incidents involving community contamination from any of the BSL-3 and BSL-4 facilities existing in the United States.

The fact remains, however, that the dangers lie not only in accidental contamination but in intentional release of these viruses, as well. It was a terrorist attack that spawned the creation of the NBAF, after all, and much of its purpose is to improve defense against potential bio-terror attacks. While most Americans would probably agree that being prepared for these attacks is vital, when it comes to building the facilities for preparedness, the “not-in-my-backyard” phenomenon comes into play.

And the NBAF is no exception. According to the Associated Press, resistance to the research center has cropped up mightily around many of the proposed sites. City councils in Wisconsin and California have voted to oppose construction. Residents outside Madison, Wis., are buying up land rights just to prevent the development. In Mississippi, citizens have picketed the site visits and posted “No Bio-Labs” signs. And there has been vehement opposition at public meetings in Leavenworth, Kan., home to two other federal facilities, a civilian prison and a military prison; local residents have voiced concerns about lab safety, congestion and the potential terrorism risk created wherever the lab is placed.

This final concern has been a common thread in opposition to the NBAF at sites all across the country: By creating a facility to combat terrorism, are we actually forming a larger, infinitely more dangerous terrorist target than ever before? The consolidation of so many lethal viruses and substances presents an enormous challenge for the DHS. Moreover, the state that plays host to such a site would seem to present an easy target for terrorists looking for a vast impact. The federal government has promised the highest level of security, but will it be enough? The recent tragedy at Virginia Tech brought to light the frightening lack of effective emergency communications on university campuses, where all the potential NBAF sites are located, and there have been no answers from the government on how to resolve the precarious situation that such a combination creates.

But Dr. David Lee, vice president for research at UGA and the leader of Georgia’s efforts to win the NBAF, says it wouldn’t be advantageous to a terrorist to implement
a conventional terrorist attack on such a site, as flying a plane into the place would light it on fire and destroy many of the pathogens rather than spreading them.

“The notion that some people have that a terrorist might fly a jet plane into this facility is not a scientifically valid concept,” he says.

Another concern surrounding the lab is money. Congress has approved the use of $47 million for design and architecture, but no funds have yet been appropriated to actually construct the 500,000-square-foot lab, which would house research functions for the DHS, the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Agriculture. Operating budgets for the facility are also uncertain, and the DHS refused to offer estimates for this story. The current research center at Plum Island received an operations and maintenance budget of $26 million in federal money this year and around $14.4 million for research in agriculture and homeland security.

No large-scale opposition to the NBAF has been voiced yet in Georgia. Officials here remain confident that the numerous benefits of hosting the facility will outweigh its built-in risks as they plug the state’s sites as the best for the job. SP

Stephanie Ramage contributed reporting to this article.